Introduction
The premise underlying much of modern finance is that most public corporations have diffused ownership in which the shareholders receive benefits in proportion to their fractional ownership and corporate decisions are made by professional managers with incentive compatible contracts. This premise is reflected in a wide range of analyses. For example, modern financial theory analyzes decisions, such as capital structure, dividend policy, investment and production decisions, and the allocation of rights amongst different claimholders, under the assumption of a proportional division of benefits to diffuse shareholders.
Recent empirical evidence shows that certain investors may exercise control over important corporate decisions that is disproportionate to their shareholdings, however.
For example, Denis, Denis and Sarin (1997a) show that outside blockholders may influence managers to avoid adopting value reducing diversification strategies. Similarly, Denis, Denis and Sarin (1997b) show that a change in the top manager is significantly more likely in a poorly performing firm in which there is an outside shareholder who has a significant stake. In addition to value enhancing activities, the controlling shareholders may be able to generate private benefits at the expense of the minority shareholders 1 . For example, Easterbrook (1984) and Jensen (1986) suggest that a substantial opportunity to generate private benefits may exist by controlling a firm's capital structure and dividend policy, especially for very profitable firms with limited investment opportunities. Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990) further argue that the 1 The ability to generate private benefits may be quite modest when provisions in the corporate charter specifically allow protections for non-controlling shareholders.
ability to obtain private benefits depends on the ownership and governance structure of the firm.
There is also a great deal of evidence showing that control is valued, which would not be the case if controlling managers (or shareholders) received the same benefit as the other investors. Holderness (1989, 1992) find that in the United States, large blocks of equity trade at an average premium of 20% relative to the post-announcement exchange price, indicating that the buyers of blocks that may have a controlling influence receive special benefits. Several studies compare the prices of shares with identical dividend rights, but differential voting rights. Mikkelson (1983, 1984) , DeAngelo and DeAngelo (19850, and Zingales (1995) all show that, in the United
States, shares with superior voting characteristics trade at a premium. Even though this premium is very small on average, Zingales (1995) shows that it rises sharply where control is contested, indicating again that controlling rights earn benefits that are not available to minority shareholders.
Additional evidence comes from other countries. Levy (1982) , Rydqvist (1987) , Horner (1988) , and Zingales (1994) report finding substantial premiums paid for voting control in Israel, Sweden, Switzerland, and Italy, respectively. However, the extant literature, though extensive, does not answer the question, "What is the value of control?"
Studies on voting rights establish that control is valuable. The research on block trades by Barclay and Holderness (1989) provides an estimate of the value of partial control. There are other studies on premiums paid in takeover transactions in which control is acquired that provide an upper bound on the value of control, because the takeover premium compensates the target for factors other than control 2 .
In this article we estimate the value of control for a set of domestic and foreign transactions 3 . Our approach is straightforward. We identify a set of 9,566 acquisitions of public companies between 1986 and 2000 in the seven most industrialized nations, otherwise known as the Group of 7 (G7) nations. The G7 nations are the United States, Japan, Germany, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, and Canada. We next categorize each of these transactions as minority or majority transactions based on the fraction of shares acquired and held after the acquisition. Minority transactions are defined as those in which the acquirer had less than 30% ownership both before and after completion of the deal. Majority transactions are defined as those in which the acquirer had less than 30% ownership before the deal and at least 50% after completion of the deal. Next we match the minority and majority transactions based on the industry, year of the deal, attitude of the deal (hostile or not), and the country of the target. Then we compare the premiums paid for acquiring the minority and majority positions; the difference between the two is our measure of the control premium.
Our research has produced the following principal findings:
• A majority position in a company based in the United States is acquired at a median premium that is 20-30 percentage points higher than the premium paid for a minority position. A similar 20-30% control premium is paid in other "market-oriented" countries, namely the United Kingdom and Canada. The control premiums paid in "bank-oriented" countries, namely Japan, France, Italy and Germany, are appreciably lower.
• A higher offer premium is paid for majority transactions in which the acquirer and the target are from different nations. However, because the differential between domestic and cross-border transactions is even higher for minority transactions, the control premium paid for domestic transactions is higher than that for cross-border transactions.
• The variations across industries in the control premiums paid are similar in the United
States and foreign countries. Also, for certain industries, the control premium is higher. For example, for our sample the acquirers paid the highest control premiums for U.S and foreign targets in the chemical industry (two-digit SIC Code 28).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the value of control and the extant empirical literature. Section 3 discusses our data sources and reports descriptive statistics for the sample transactions. We also discuss the methodology we employed to measure the control premium. Section 4 reports evidence on the control premium categorized by year, industry, attitude, and size of the target. Section 5 provides results on the control premium for the G-7 nations. Section 6 concludes.
Corporate Control

A Definition of Control
Typically control of a corporation can be defined as the direct power to cause more than 50% of the existing shareholder votes to be cast in the same manner. In certain situations it is clear that a party has "direct power to cause" more than 50% of the votes to be cast in a certain way; examples include an individual owning more than 50% of the outstanding shares of voting stock, a person holding irrevocable proxies representing more than 50% of the outstanding shares of voting stock, and the trustee of a voting trust into which has been deposited more than 50% of the outstanding shares of voting stock.
In other circumstances it is not as obvious whether "direct power to cause" exists.
For example, a certain individual or group could have effective control at a level of ownership lower than 50%. Weston (1979) shows that no firm in which the managers have 30% ownership has ever been acquired without the cooperation of the managers. At the same time, 50% voting power is not necessarily a theoretically perfect measure of control. For example, 50% of share voting power would not be sufficient to win outright any shareholder elections in corporations whose corporate charters require a supermajority (say, 66 2/3%) for every vote and where cumulative voting does not exist.
On the other hand, in firms with a relatively small number of shareholders, the interests of minority shareholders are sometimes protected by requiring unanimous consent on important decisions. When corporate decisions require the unanimous consent of all shareholders, the allocation of shares no longer reflects the relative voting power of different shareholders. Specifically, each shareholder effectively enjoys the same voting power as all others. This has two implications for the allocation of control benefits within the firm: (a) in areas explicitly covered by the veto, all shareholders will capture an equal share of the private control benefits emanating from the decisions taken by the firm, and (2) even in areas that are unprotected by the veto, 'small' shareholders may be able to exercise a disproportionate influence on decisions because of the veto power they enjoy in protected areas. In the latter case, the phenomenon of "logrolling" would allow minority shareholders to trade off votes in protected areas for favorable decisions in unprotected areas.
Economic Rationales for a Control Premium
Ownership of shares in a corporation may conveniently be analyzed as composed of three elements of value: the right to a proportionate share of the corporation's net wealth, or asset value; the right to a proportionate share of distributions from the corporation, or income value; and proportionate participation in management of the enterprise, or control value. The dissection of share value into these components suggests that participation in management has some inherent value that is independent of the income and asset values of the corporation. The usual explanation of the control premium is that the power to elect and remove directors, appoint and remove officers, fix salaries, assure oneself a job at a reasonable salary, declare dividends, and dissolve or merge the corporation is 8 valuable. The shortcoming of this approach as a justification for control premiums is that it fails to explain why participation in management is valuable apart from the fact that it enables one to affect corporate income and asset values. Any other inherent value of management powers is not obvious. One school of thought is that the value of control is due to an egocentric drive to run an ever-larger enterprise 4 .
A second rationale for control premiums focuses upon the relationship between control and corporate performance. An acquirer might pay a premium for controlling shares because an investment in controlling shares is a more promising, or at least a safer, investment than one in non-controlling shares for the simple reason that it will enable the investor to implement what he believes to be the best policies in the management of his investment (or at least void any actions that would be detrimental to shareholder value).
A third type of rationale for control premiums is that control carries with it the ability to engage in self-dealing. Self-dealing occurs when a controlling shareholder uses his power over corporate management in ways that benefit himself at the expense of minority shareholders. In closely-held corporations, perhaps the most common variety of selfdealing occurs when the controlling shareholder causes the corporation to employ him at a salary in excess of his productive contribution to the company. His excessive salary reduces corporate earnings, to which minority shareholders have pro rata claims, but at no loss to the control shareholder. Another form of self-dealing involves "looting" activities whereby controlling shareholders withdraw assets from the corporation, either without paying anything for them or by paying less than fair market value. Self-dealing also encompasses "freeze-out" and "squeeze-out" activities, whereby the controlling shareholders use fundamental corporate changes such as recapitalizations and mergers to actually increase their pro rata claims to income and assets and reduce the pro rata claims of minority shareholders.
Empirical Evidence on the Control Premium
There are three areas of research that have contributed to the empirical estimate of the control premium. The line of research that has been examined most extensively is the premium paid for acquiring controlling interests in firms. As Jensen and Ruback (1983) wrote that: "It is clear … that much is known about the market. Indeed, it is unlikely that any set of transactions has been studied in such detail." However, the premium paid in a takeover attempt could be compensation for a variety of factors, including control. For example, an acquirer may identify an undervalued target and be willing to pay a premium to acquire a majority stake in the company. Therefore, at best the premiums paid in takeover transactions serve as the upper bound on the value of control.
The second line of research involves the study of dual-class shares. Mikelson (1983,1984) show that the distribution of payoffs provided by a common stock depends upon whether the ownership of the stock also conveys control over the firm's activities. Specifically, they studied the share prices of 30 companies that had two classes of publicly traded common stock outstanding during the period 1940-78 that were differentiated only by their voting rights. Month-end trade prices for the two share classes from the same day of trading were used to infer the value of differential voting rights, or rights to control the firm's activities. For 26 of the 30 firms, the observed month-end pairs of trade prices were consistent with a positive price premium being placed on the class of shares with superior voting rights. Specially, on average the class of shares with superior voting rights had a 5.4% price premium relative to the class with the inferior voting rights. Thus, in 26 of 30 cases the relative pricing was consistent with the positive value of control. . DeAngelo and DeAngelo (19850, and Zingales (1995) Zingales (1994) and Barca (1995) suggest that the high premium in Italy is a consequence of the ability of managers to divert profits to themselves rather than sharing them with the nonvoting shareholders.
The limitation of these studies is that even though they establish that there is a positive value of voting rights, they do not provide any estimates about the value of control. This is because these studies examine minority positions with voting rights relative to minority positions without voting rights.
A third body of literature relies on the examination of the pricing of block trades.
Barclay and Holderness (1989) analyzed the pricing of 63 block trades between 1978 and
1982 involving at least 5% of the common stock of NYSE or AMEX Corporation. They found that these blocks were typically priced at an average 20% premium relative to the post-announcement exchange price. They argue that these premiums reflect private benefits that accrue exclusively to the blockholder because of their voting power. They further show that the premiums paid by both individual and corporate block purchasers increase with firm size, fractional ownership, and firm performance. Individuals pay larger premiums for firms with greater leverage, lower stock-return variances, and larger cash holdings.
Sample Description and Methodology
Sample Description
Our sample consists of acquisitions of public companies from Securities Data Corporation (SDC) between January 1986 and September 2000 for which stock price data were available four-weeks prior to the announcement of the transaction. 5 This study is only interested in mergers and acquisitions that actually occurred. Consequently, we limited our sample to include only the transactions that were in the form of a merger or an acquisition and that were deemed completed. Additionally, each transaction was required to have data available on the percentage of shares outstanding acquired in the deal. Furthermore, we excluded 48 transactions for which certain entries appeared suspicious. 6 Finally, following the methodology used in studies that examine toehold investments, we excluded all transactions where the percent of shares acquired was less than five percent (see for example Choi (1991)). The reason for a five-percent cutoff is that owners with investments of at least five percent are considered to be beneficiary owners and are required to file a statement with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Our selection criteria resulted in a final sample of 6,119 transactions in the United States and 3,447 foreign transactions. transactions out of a total of 6,119 the acquirer owned less than 10% of the target prior to the deal and in 4,055 transactions the deal resulted in the acquirer owning more than 90% of the target. Similarly, Panel B of Table 1 shows that for foreign targets in 2,688
transactions out of a total of 3,447 the acquirer owned less than 30% of the target prior to the deal and in 1,690 transactions the deal resulted in the acquirer owning more than 90% of the target.
We grouped our sample into two different categories of acquisitions: minority and majority transactions. Minority transactions are defined as those in which the acquirer had less than 30% ownership both before and after completion of the deal. In essence, our definition of minority transactions parallels that of toehold investments. Majority transactions are defined as those in which the acquirer had less than 30% ownership before the deal and at least 50% after completion of the deal. The basic difference between the two categories is that in a majority transaction the acquirer gains control of the target through the completion of the deal whereas in a minority transaction completion of the deal does not result in control of the target. Our definition of minority and majority transactions implicitly uses the notion that those shareholders with less than 30% do not have control of the firm. This is justified by the results presented in Weston (1979), which show that there are no cases in which firms were acquired in a hostile takeover when insiders owned more than 30%. This suggests that an insider with more than 30% ownership has effective control of the firm. In a later part of our analysis we relax this definition by using an alternate measure of control.
Panel A of Table 1 shows that for targets based in the United States our final sample is comprised of 1,675 minority transactions and 3,883 majority transactions.
Panel B of Table 1 shows that for foreign targets our final sample is comprised of 1,025 minority transactions and 1,678 majority transactions. Table 2 presents the sample characteristics of minority and majority transactions.
As we can see, the average enterprise value for the U.S. majority transactions is $1.725 billion, which is more than twice the enterprise value of minority transactions of $844 million. 7 Foreign transactions also display a higher average enterprise value for control transactions than for minority transactions, even though the difference is not large. Table 2 shows that another common element shared by the United States and other countries is that control transactions are more likely to be between acquirers and 7 The enterprise value is calculated by multiplying the number of actual target company shares outstanding by the offering price and then adding the book value of short-term debt, straight debt, convertible debt and preferred stock less marketable securities. The latter values are based on the most recent financial information prior to the announcement of the transaction.
targets with the same two-digit SIC code. In the United States almost 60% of control transactions are in related industries. Minority transactions are more diversifying in nature. Only 15% of minority U.S. transactions and 24% of minority foreign transactions are in related industries.
In addition, in both majority and minority transactions, on average, the acquirer starts with an insignificant stake in the target. For U.S. control transactions, the acquirers purchase an average stake of over 98% in their targets. Analogously, for U.S. minority transactions acquirers purchase an average stake of 9.6% in their targets. Corresponding numbers for our foreign sample are 91% for majority transactions and 14% for minority transactions.
One striking difference between the U.S. and foreign transactions is the fraction of cross-border transactions involved. In the United States, 8% of acquired companies are purchased by a non-domestic corporation whereas outside of the U.S. 43% of acquired companies are purchased by a non-domestic firm.
Estimation of the Control Premium
Our analysis starts by estimating the control premium for our majority transactions. In the discussion that follows we use the premium of the offer price relative to the target's trading price four weeks prior to the announcement date.
A vast body of literature indicates that the acquisition premium is either information driven or control driven. In a financial transaction the acquirer may pay a premium because it has information that the target is under-valued. Alternatively, the bidding firm expects to exploit some specialized resources by getting control of the target and implementing a higher valued operating strategy. The revised operating strategy may involve more efficient management, economies of scale, improved production techniques, the combinations of complementary resources, increased market power, redeployment of assets to more profitable uses, or any other value creating mechanism that is within the realm of corporate synergy. Therefore, the premium paid in majority transactions might overstate the true value of control since this premium might contain informational value. In an ideal experiment we would like to compare two transactions in which the only difference is that in one transaction the acquirer is able to gain control and in the other it does not. The closest we can get to implementing this experiment empirically is to compare the premium paid for a majority transaction with that of a minority transaction. The argument is that some of the non-control rationales for the acquisition premium are reflected in the premiums paid for minority transactions.
Therefore, our measure of the control premium is the difference between a minority transaction and a matched majority transaction. Specifically, we estimate the control premium as the difference between the premium for a minority transaction and the median premium paid for all majority transactions that took place in the same country;
during the same year; in the same industry; and with the same attitude. 8 We match each minority transaction with all the comparable majority transactions and not the other way around because our sample has many more majority transactions than minority transactions. .0% in 1998. The control premiums are also smaller for foreign targets. In the 10 years studied, the control premium was higher for foreign targets than it was for U.S. targets only twice.
Empirical evidence on the control premium
Control Premium Categorized by Year of Acquisition
Control Premium categorized by Industry
The value of control can differ across industry. Table 4 presents the premiums for the top 10 two-digit SIC codes in our sample. As in Table 3 , we can observe that in only 2 out of the 10 industry categories is the premium paid for U.S. majority transactions lower than that paid for foreign targets.
The premium for U.S. majority transactions ranges from a low of 16.4% for "holding and other investment" (two-digit SIC code 67) to a high of 44.9% for "machinery and computer equipment" (two-digit SIC code XX). For majority transactions involving foreign targets the premium ranges between 20.0% and 40.6%.
Not surprisingly, the ranking of premiums across industries is almost identical between transactions involving U.S. and foreign targets. For example, the lowest majority transaction premiums are 16.4% for U.S. targets and 20.0% for foreign targets both in the "holding and other investment" industry (two-digit SIC code 67). The highest control premium is 34.7% for U.S. targets and 63.9% for foreign targets, both in the "chemical and allied products" industry (two-digit SIC code 28). Likewise, the lowest control premium is 9.3% for U.S. targets and 0% for foreign targets, both in the "holding and other investments" industry (two-digit SIC code 67). Table 5 illustrates the control premium categorized by the attitude of the transaction. We would expect ceteris paribus that a hostile or unsolicited bid for a target would command higher a premium than would a friendly or neutral bid. This is the case even in minority transactions. Again in all four different categories of attitude of the transaction the U.S. targets command higher premiums than their foreign counterparts.
Control Premium categorized by attitude of the transaction
Control Premium categorized by enterprise value of the target
It has been argued that the size of the target could influence the premium paid by the acquirer; see for example XXX.
In light of this argument, Table 6 reports the premiums categorized by deciles of the target's enterprise value. Enterprise value is calculated by multiplying the number of the target's actual shares outstanding by the offering price and then adding the book value of short-term debt, straight debt, convertible debt and preferred stock less marketable securities. The latter values are based on the most recent financial information prior to the announcement of the transaction. As we can see, there are no clear trends in the magnitude of premiums across minority and majority transactions, or in our estimate of the control premium. The general observation of a higher premium paid for a U.S. target is also reflected in this table.
International evidence of a control premium
Analysis of G7 countries
We analyzed the control premium separately for each member of the G7 nations, previously identified as the United States, Japan, Germany, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, and Canada. Although the G7 countries are similar in their level of economic development, their market for corporate control and the corporate governance role played by banks and securities market are different. Much of the previous literature has focused on a classification of countries based on the size and power of the banking sector. This classification has given rise to the term "bank-oriented" (Japan, Germany, France, Italy) and "market-oriented" countries (United States, United Kingdom, Canada). 9 In Table 7 we present the premium separately for each of the G7 nations. Table 7 clearly shows that most acquisition transactions occur in market-oriented countries. This result may reflect the fact that the number of listed securities is much higher and the market for corporate control is more active in market-oriented countries. We find that the premiums paid in market-oriented countries are considerably higher than in bank-oriented countries.
Furthermore, in the United States the median premium for majority transactions is 37%, for minority transactions it is 8%, and the control premium is 26%. In the United Kingdom, the premium for majority transactions is 40%, for minority transactions it is 8% and the control premium is 21%. These results are in sharp contrast to Japan, for example, where both the majority and the minority transaction premiums are negative. In
France, another bank-oriented country, the median premium for majority transactions is 22%, for minority transaction it is 7%, and the control premium is less than 1%.
We further categorized the transactions in each of the G7 countries by the nationalities of the acquirer and the target. We refer to the cases in which both the acquirer and the target are from the same country as domestic transactions. In the cases where they are not we refer to them as cross-border transactions. It is noteworthy that both majority and minority cross-border transactions command higher premiums in market-oriented countries. However, the control premium is lower for the cross-border transactions. For example, in the United States the domestic majority transactions command a premium of 36% whereas the cross-border majority transactions command a premium of 44%. The domestic minority transactions have a corresponding premium of 7.5% while the cross-border minority transactions have a corresponding premium of 13%. The control premium for domestic transactions is 27% compared to 20% for crossborder transactions. Collectively, this suggests that while the acquirer pays a higher 9 See for example Rajan and Zingales (1995) premium when acquiring companies internationally the amount by which they overpay is higher when they buy minority stakes.
On the Robustness of our Findings
Our findings to this point are largely consistent with the hypothesis that control premiums are higher in the market-oriented countries. Furthermore the premiums paid are also higher for cross-border transactions than for domestic transactions. In Tables 8   through 10 we report the results of several robustness checks in which we alter the methodology used to calculate majority, minority, and control premiums.
Up to this point in our analysis we have used a stringent definition of a minority transaction. Specifically, only those transactions in which the acquirer acquired less than 30% of the shares outstanding were classified as minority transactions. This creates at least one potential problem: The average size of the minority transactions is by construction smaller than that of a majority transaction. Therefore, what we refer to as the control premium could be a reflection of the size differences between the stakes acquired in these two types of transactions.
We address this issue in two different ways. First, in Table 8 we repeat our previous analysis using an alternate definition of minority and majority transactions. In this analysis, we define a minority transaction as one in which the acquirer owned less than 50% of the firm both before and after the deal. A majority transaction is one in which the acquirer owned less than 50% before the deal and at least 50% after the deal.
The results of this analysis, reported in Table 8 , are remarkably similar to the results under our original definition of control. For example, in the United Kingdom our original assessment showed that domestic majority transactions had a premium of 38% and crossborder majority transactions had a premium of 44.4%. Using our alternate definition of majority transactions for the United Kingdom we find that the premiums are barely changed at 37.1% for domestic transactions and 44.2% for cross-border transactions.
In Tables 9 and 10 we use alternate time periods over which we calculate the premium. Specifically, in Table 9 we use the premium of the offer price relative to the trading price of the target one week prior to the announcement date. In Table 10 we use the premium of the offer price relative to the trading price of the target one day prior to the announcement date. The alternate premiums yield systematically lower results: The control premiums generated using the four-week period were the highest, the ones generated by using the one-week period were the second highest, and the lowest were the ones generated by using a one-day period. This result suggests that there is some degree of information leakage prior to the transaction. There appears to be no systematic trend in the amount of information leakage prior to the transaction across countries. On the whole, our results remain similar to the previous ones. Market-oriented countries still command higher premiums and these premiums are higher for cross-border transactions.
In Table 11 , we estimate the control premium as the difference between the offer premium paid on majority transactions and the median premium paid for all minority transactions in the same year, same two digit SIC code, same country, and with the same attitude. Here again, most of the premium estimates for U.S and foreign nations are qualitatively similar. However, unlike before, the computed control premiums are now higher for cross-border transactions than domestic transactions in all the market-oriented countries.
Conclusions
Ownership of shares in a corporation can be viewed as having two distinct components, the proportionate right to cash flows and the proportionate participation in the management of the enterprise, or control value. The value of control is derived in at least two ways. First, control can generate shared benefits for all shareholders by improving the economic performance of the firm. Second, a controlling shareholder can generate private benefits that accrue to itself, possibly even to the detriment of other shareholders. In this paper we provide a measure of the value of control. We first identify a set of 9,566 acquisitions of U.S. and non-U.S. public companies between 1986 and 2000. We next categorize each of these transactions as minority or majority transactions based on the fraction of shares acquired and held after the acquisition. Minority transactions are defined as those in which the acquirer had less than 30% ownership both before and after completion of the deal. Majority transactions are defined as those in which the acquirer had less than 30% ownership before the deal and at least 50% after completion of the deal. Next we match the minority and majority transactions based on the industry, year of the deal, attitude of the deal (hostile or not hostile), and the country of the target. Then we compare the premiums paid for acquiring the minority and majority positions; the difference between the two is our measure of the control premium.
We find that there exists a premium of around 20-30% for control. This premium has been fairly consistent across time and for different sizes of the target corporations.
However, the premium does vary by industry. Also, we find that control is more valuable in "market-oriented" countries than in "bank-oriented" countries. Furthermore, the control premium paid is lower for cross-border (acquirer and target are from different nations)
transactions. These results are robust to different specifications of the control premium. Table 2 Descriptive Statistics Our sample consists of acquisitions of stakes of five percent or greater of public companies between January 1986 and September 2000 with stock premium data available from Securities Data Corporation. Minority transactions are defined as those in which the acquirer had less than 30% ownership both before and after completion of the deal. Majority transactions are defined as those in which the acquirer had less than 30% ownership before the deal and at least 50% after completion of the deal. Control premium is the difference between the premium for a minority transaction and the median premium paid for all majority transactions that took place in the same country, during the same year, in the same industry, and with the same attitude. Enterprise value is calculated by multiplying the number of actual shares outstanding of the target by the offering price and then adding the book value of short-term debt, straight debt, convertible debt and preferred stock less marketable securities. The latter values are based on the most recent financial information prior to the announcement of the transaction. Related industry transactions are those that occur when acquirers and targets are in the same two-digit SIC code. Cross-border transactions are those in which the acquirer is based in a different country from the target. Domestic transactions are those in which the acquirer is based in the same country as the target. 
Majority Transactions Minority Transactions
Table 3 Control Premium by Year
Our sample consists of acquisitions of stakes of five percent or greater of public companies between January 1986 and September 2000 with stock premium data available from Securities Data Corporation. Minority transactions are defined as those in which the acquirer had less than 30% ownership both before and after completion of the deal. Majority transactions are defined as those in which the acquirer had less than 30% ownership before the deal and at least 50% after completion of the deal. Control premium is the difference between the premium for a minority transaction and the median premium paid for all majority transactions that took place in the same country, during the same year, in the same industry, and with the same attitude. Enterprise value is calculated by multiplying the number of actual shares outstanding of the target by the offering price and then adding the book value of short-term debt, straight debt, convertible debt and preferred stock less marketable securities. The latter values are based on the most recent financial information prior to the announcement of the transaction. Related industry transactions are those that occur when acquirers and targets are in the same two-digit SIC code. Table 4 Control Premium by Industry Our sample consists of acquisitions of stakes of five percent or greater of public companies between January 1986 and September 2000 with stock premium data available from Securities Data Corporation. Minority transactions are defined as those in which the acquirer had less than 30% ownership both before and after completion of the deal. Majority transactions are defined as those in which the acquirer had less than 30% ownership before the deal and at least 50% after completion of the deal. Control premium is the difference between the premium for a minority transaction and the median premium paid for all majority transactions that took place in the same country, during the same year, in the same industry, and with the same attitude.
Premium Table 5 Control Premium by Attitude of the Transaction Our sample consists of acquisitions of stakes of five percent or greater of public companies between January 1986 and September 2000 with stock premium data available from Securities Data Corporation. Minority transactions are defined as those in which the acquirer had less than 30% ownership both before and after completion of the deal. Majority transactions are defined as those in which the acquirer had less than 30% ownership before the deal and at least 50% after completion of the deal. Control premium is the difference between the premium for a minority transaction and the median premium paid for all majority transactions that took place in the same country, during the same year, in the same industry, and with the same attitude. Table 6 Control Premium by Enterprise Value Our sample consists of acquisitions of stakes of five percent or greater of public companies between January 1986 and September 2000 with stock premium data available from Securities Data Corporation. Minority transactions are defined as those in which the acquirer had less than 30% ownership both before and after completion of the deal. Majority transactions are defined as those in which the acquirer had less than 30% ownership before the deal and at least 50% after completion of the deal. Control premium is the difference between the premium for a minority transaction and the median premium paid for all majority transactions that took place in the same country, during the same year, in the same industry, and with the same attitude. Enterprise value is calculated by multiplying the number of actual shares outstanding of the target by the offering price and then adding the book value of short-term debt, straight debt, convertible debt and preferred stock less marketable securities. The latter values are based on the most recent financial information prior to the announcement of the transaction. Table 7 Control premium for G7 Countries Our sample consists of acquisitions of stakes of five percent or greater of public companies between January 1986 and September 2000 with stock premium data available from Securities Data Corporation. Minority transactions are defined as those in which the acquirer had less than 30% ownership both before and after completion of the deal. Majority transactions are defined as those in which the acquirer had less than 30% ownership before the deal and at least 50% after completion of the deal. Control premium is the difference between the premium for a minority transaction and the median premium paid for all majority transactions that took place in the same country, during the same year, in the same industry, and with the same attitude. Cross-border transactions are those in which the acquirer is based in a different country from the target. Domestic transactions are those in which the acquirer is based in the same country as the target. Table 8 Control premium for G7 Countries Our sample consists of acquisitions of stakes of five percent or greater of public companies between January 1986 and September 2000 with stock premium data available from Securities Data Corporation. Minority transactions are defined as those in which the acquirer had less than 50% ownership both before and after completion of the deal. Majority transactions are defined as those in which the acquirer had less than 50% ownership before the deal and at least 50% after completion of the deal. Control premium is the difference between the premium for a minority transaction and the median premium paid for all majority transactions that took place in the same country, during the same year, in the same industry, and with the same attitude. Cross-border transactions are those in which the acquirer is based in a different country from the target. Domestic transactions are those in which the acquirer is based in the same country as the target. Table 9 Control premium for G7 Countries Our sample consists of acquisitions of stakes of five percent or greater of public companies between January 1986 and September 2000 with stock premium data available from Securities Data Corporation. Minority transactions are defined as those in which the acquirer had less than 30% ownership both before and after completion of the deal. Majority transactions are defined as those in which the acquirer had less than 30% ownership before the deal and at least 50% after completion of the deal. Control premium is the difference between the premium for a minority transaction and the median premium paid for all majority transactions that took place in the same country, during the same year, in the same industry, and with the same attitude. Cross-border transactions are those in which the acquirer is based in a different country from the target. Domestic transactions are those in which the acquirer is based in the same country as the target. Table 10 Control premium for G7 Countries Our sample consists of acquisitions of stakes of five percent or greater of public companies between January 1986 and September 2000 with stock premium data available from Securities Data Corporation. Minority transactions are defined as those in which the acquirer had less than 30% ownership both before and after completion of the deal. Majority transactions are defined as those in which the acquirer had less than 30% ownership before the deal and at least 50% after completion of the deal. Control premium is the difference between the premium for a minority transaction and the median premium paid for all majority transactions that took place in the same country, during the same year, in the same industry, and with the same attitude. Cross-border transactions are those in which the acquirer is based in a different country from the target. Domestic transactions are those in which the acquirer is based in the same country as the target. 
Table 11
Control premium for G7 Countries Our sample consists of acquisitions of stakes of five percent or greater of public companies between January 1986 and September 2000 with stock premium data available from Securities Data Corporation. Minority transactions are defined as those in which the acquirer had less than 30% ownership both before and after completion of the deal. Majority transactions are defined as those in which the acquirer had less than 30% ownership before the deal and at least 50% after completion of the deal. Control premium is the difference between the premium for a majority transaction and the median premium paid for all minority transactions that took place in the same country, during the same year, in the same industry, and with the same attitude. Cross-border transactions are those in which the acquirer is based in a different country from the target. Domestic transactions are those in which the acquirer is based in the same country as the target.
